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I.
INTEREST OF AMICI
 As the Governors of Minnesota and Rhode Island, respectively, amici Tim 
Pawlenty and Donald L. Carcieri have a direct interest in this case. The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) fundamentally transforms 
Medicaid and will effectively co-opt control over the States’ budgetary processes 
and legislative agendas, crowding out spending on other state priorities, including 
duties that are mandated by state constitutions.1 Given their role in shaping and 
overseeing state budgets, the Governors have a vital stake in ensuring that basic 
limits on the federal government’s spending power are maintained.2 One of those 
limits is that any conditions imposed by federal law must be clear, so that States 
may exercise their choice to accept or reject federal funds “knowingly, cognizant 
of the consequences of their participation.”3 On November 12, this Court granted 
the Governors leave to file their amicus brief (Docket # 108).
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Minn. Const., Art. XIII, § 1 (state has “duty” to “establish a general and 
uniform system of public schools” that is “thorough and efficient”); Rhode Island Const., 
Art. XII (state has “duty” to “promote public schools and public libraries” to foster 
“diffusion of knowledge,” and to not “divert” education funds).
2 See, e.g., Rhode Island Const., Art. IX, § 15 (Governor “shall prepare and present” the 
state budget “to the general assembly”); Minn. Const., Art. IV, § 23 (line-item veto).
3 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
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II.
ARGUMENT
The Affordable Care Act is Unconstitutionally Vague and Indefinite
A. The ACA’s Ambiguity Renders It Illegitimate Under Spending-Clause 
Jurisprudence, Which Requires That Federal Conditions Be Clear and 
Definite Enough to Be Contractually Valid and Enforceable
As plaintiffs rightly note, the ACA “violates the principle that conditions on 
federal funds must be unambiguous, so as to ‘enable the states to exercise their 
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”4 This is 
both because the ACA includes “vast potential liabilities that cannot even be 
projected as of now,” and because “the ACA’s sweeping changes could not 
reasonably have been foreseen by the states when they started their Medicaid 
programs.”5
Even looking at the ACA purely from the vantage point of the present,
rather than when States began participating in Medicaid, the ACA is so ambiguous 
and indefinite that it is facially unconstitutional, as we explain below. This 
vagueness undermines political accountability and thus aggravates the ACA’s 
unduly coercive aspects, in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
As a result, the States could not have voluntarily and knowingly 
assumed the burdens and liabilities now imposed on them by the ACA.
6
                                                          
4 Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 36.
5 Id.. at 42, 45.
6 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (Spending Clause legislation’s 
legitimacy is rooted in the fact that “where Congress encourages state regulation rather 
than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's 
preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.”; “Accountability is thus 
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized legislation enacted 
pursuant to the spending power as “much in the nature of a contract:  in return for 
federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”7
But even if States could choose to stop participating in the Medicaid 
program, the ACA is so vague that it does not – and cannot – allow the States “to 
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their 
participation.”  Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst). The ACA fails to 
speak “unambiguously,” Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, about how a State can opt out
of Medicaid’s expansion, and what State compliance may mean if it opts in.    
“The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus 
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 
contract.”  Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
Because the States are not given a clear and informed choice between 
participation and non-participation, the Act lacks the hallmarks of contractual 
enforceability.  See, e.g., Matter of T & B General Contracting, 833 F.2d 1455, 
1459 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Without a meeting of the minds on all essential terms, no 
enforceable contract arises.”).8
                                                                                                                                                                            
diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in 
accordance with the views of the local electorate.”). 
The Act is indefinite in other key respects as well, 
so “we cannot fairly say that [a] State could make an informed choice.” Pennhurst,
7 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see also Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 
(2002); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006). 
8 See also Association Ben. Services, Inc. v. Caremark RX, Inc., 493 F.3d 841, 850 (7th 
Cir. 2007); Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 33; see Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 (must 
show states’ acceptance of “the terms of the contract’”).    
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451 U.S. at 25.  “There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is 
unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”9
B. The ACA’s Complexity Accentuates Its Vagueness
The ACA is so mammoth, its provisions are so complex, and its passage 
was so irregular that the federal attorneys who have spent the past eight months 
defending it cannot even clearly identify its length.  (See Tr. at 8, Docket # 77).
Its sheer complexity is aptly, but only partially, captured by the chart provided by 
minority staff of the Joint Economic Committee, which is found on the next 
page.10 (While that “chart displays a bewildering array of new government 
agencies, regulations and mandates,” the reality is even more complicated, since 
“committee analysts could not fit the entire health care bill on one chart. ‘This 
portrays only about one-third of the complexity of the final bill. It’s actually worse 
than this.’”11
                                                          
9 Id. at 17-18; see Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 548 U.S. at 296; Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186.
10 See Joint Economic Committee, Republican Staff, Your New Health Care System,
available at http://jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=5ee16e0f-
6ee6-4643-980e-b4d5f1d7759a (visited Nov. 18, 2010); Nebraska v. E.P.A., 331 F.3d 
995, 998 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (taking judicial notice of agency materials on web); Air 
Transport Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 613 F.3d 206, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing JEC 
report); Livermore v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984) (report by JEC staff).
11 See Joint Economic Committee Republicans, America’s New Health Care System 
Revealed: Updated Chart Shows Obamacare's Bewildering Complexity, Committee 
News, Aug. 2, 2010 (quoting Rep. Brady), available at
http://jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/index.cfm?p=CommitteeNews&ContentRecord_i
d=bb302d88-3d0d-4424-8e33-3c5d2578c2b0 (visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
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This enormous complexity accentuates its vagueness,12
Thus, the Plaintiff States cannot be expected to “exercise their choice knowingly, 
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”  Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
and makes it all but 
impossible to comprehend “from the perspective of a state official who is engaged 
in the process of deciding whether the State should accept [federal] funds and the 
obligations that go with those funds.” Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 548 U.S. at 291.
C. The ACA’s Vagueness Is Aggravated by the Vast Discretion and 
Virtual Blank Check It Gives to the Federal Officials Who Implement It
Even if the ACA’s text were fully understood, many of its requirements would
ultimately be unknowable due to the unprecedented discretion granted to federal 
officials to implement key provisions.  States, for example, will be required to 
“develop service systems” to provide long-term care that “allocate resources for 
services in a manner that is responsible to the changing needs and choices of 
beneficiaries . . . .”  ACA § 2404(a).  The substance of this vague mandate is 
delegated to the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  Id.
Similarly, states must provide individuals who are “newly eligible” for 
Medicaid with “benchmark” coverage.  ACA § 2001(a)(2)(A).  The substance of 
this mandate too is expressly delegated to the discretion of the Secretary.  ACA §§ 
2001(c)(3), 1302(a), (b).  The Secretary is also empowered to determine, inter
alia, state enrollment programs for Medicaid and CHIP, ACA § 1413(a), obstetric 
                                                          
12 Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991)(“complexity” of statutes can make “it 
difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend” their requirements); Hope 
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 866-67 (7th Cir. 1999), vacated, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000) 
(“complex” provisions can result in “unfair surprise”).
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and smoking cessation services that must be provided by the states, ACA §§ 2301, 
4107, and myriad data collection, evaluation, and reporting requirements that must 
be carried out by the states, see, e.g., ACA §§ 2001(d)(1)(C), 2701, 2951.  
The Secretary’s vast discretion in implementing the ACA is illustrated by 
the more than 111 waivers that she has granted to employers whose health care 
plans were unable to satisfy the ACA’s costly mandates.13 1.2 million employees 
participate in the health plans that have already received waivers, and far more 
may be affected in the future.14 These waivers are not permanent, but last for only 
one year, adding further uncertainty.15 Moreover, there is no telling whether these
ad hoc waivers, some of which were granted to politically-influential unions or
businesses that supported the Administration and the ACA’s passage,16 will 
granted in the future to anyone else.17
                                                          
13 E.g., Reed Abelson, Health Rules Are Waived More Often, New York Times, Nov. 10, 
2010, at B2 (available at www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/health/policy/10waiver.html); 
Department of Health and Human Services, Approved Applications for Waiver of the 
Annual Limits Requirements of the PHS Act Section 2711 As of Nov. 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_for_waiver.html.
If not, States may face enormous additional 
14 Abelson, Health Rules Are Waived More Often, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at B2.
15 Department of Health and Human Services, Approved Applications for Waiver of the 
Annual Limits Requirements of the PHS Act Section 2711 As of Nov. 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/approved_applications_for_waiver.html; see 
Abelson, Health Rules Are Waived More Often, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at B2.
16 See Michelle Malkin, Creators Syndicate, Repeal Is the Ultimate Obamacare Waiver,
Washington Examiner, Nov. 18, 2010, at 43 (www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/
columns/Repeal-is-the-ultimate-Obamacare-waiver-1595832-108685514.html).
17 See Michelle Malkin, Waiver-Mania! The Ever-Expanding Obamacare Escapee List,
Nov. 14, 2010, at 10:26 a.m. (http://michellemalkin.com/2010/11/14/waiver-mania-the-
ever-expanding-obamacare-escapee-list/) (arguing that Obama Administration is granting 
these “temporary” waivers not out of “compassion” or for consistent policy reasons, “but 
out of a panicked urgency to avoid a public relations disaster” of employers dumping 
large numbers of employees from health insurance shortly after passage of a law that the 
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costs, both from people who lose their employer-provided health insurance18 and 
end up on state-subsidized Medicaid programs, and, to a lesser extent, from the
burdens it imposes on state employers (such as increased premium costs,19 and 
assessments imposed on employers for failure to offer the level of insurance
mandated under ACA rules.) The Secretary’s vast discretion in writing and 
waiving ACA rules makes predicting these costs simply impossible, and makes it
impossible for States to ascertain “the consequences of their participation,” Dole,
483 U.S. at 207.  (Many rules that HHS is supposed to issue to implement the
ACA’s vague requirements have not been issued yet, and either have no statutory 
deadline at all,20 or have deadlines that have been flouted.21
                                                                                                                                                                            
President promised would allow employees to keep their healthcare plan if they liked it); 
Reed Abelson, Waivers Aim at Talk of Dropping Health Coverage, New York Times, 
Oct. 7, 2010, at B1 (Obama Administration “tried to defuse stiffening resistance” to ACA 
through waivers, “as part of a broader strategic effort” to mollify critics “at a time when 
the midterm elections are looming”; White House official “acknowledged that the 
concessions given to companies and insurers reflected attempts to avoid having people 
lose their current coverage before the full law goes into effect”; “politics from state to 
state” cited as factor in debate over how stringently to enforce ACA mandates) 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/business/07insure.html)
).
18 In the absence of waivers, many employers will drop their health care plans.  See, e.g.,
Michelle Malkin, Repeal Is the Ultimate Obamacare Waiver, Washington Examiner, 
Nov. 18, 2010, at 43 (Fowler Packing Company “pursued an HHS waiver because their 
low-wage agricultural workers would have lost the[ir] basic coverage” absent a waiver,
stripping “large numbers of workers” of “access to affordable coverage.’”)
19 See Dr. Marc Siegel, Obamacare Will Clog America’s Medical System, USA Today, 
Oct. 19, 2010, at 9A (ACA pointlessly drives “up costs and premiums”) (available at 
www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-10-19-column19_ST_N.htm); J. P. Freire, 
Dems Admit CEOs Were Right to Report Losses from Obamacare, Wash. Examiner, 
April 27, 2010, at 1:24 p.m. (www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blogs/beltway-
confidential/dems-admit-ceos-were-right-to-report-losses-from-obamacare-
92199744.html); cf. Don Surber, Obamacare Leads to 47% Premium Hike, Charleston 
Daily Mail, Oct. 16, 2010, 9 a.m. (http://blogs.dailymail.com/donsurber/archives/22999).
20 See Congressional Research Service, Deadlines for the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Oct. 1, 2010, at 1 (ACA rules
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It also remains unclear whether many state employers will be able to 
benefit from the Act’s “grandfather clause” provision protecting existing health 
plans from some of the ACA’s costly mandates, as even the government’s own 
estimates suggest.22
As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Given the complexity of the 
health care system prior to PPACA, and the many changes generated by the new 
law, the impact on states will vary and will be difficult to estimate, even with the 
HHS has adopted regulations construing that provision so 
narrowly so that it arguably does not apply to the  majority of employers. George 
Pantos, Manage Rising Health Care Costs, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Sept. 20, 
2010, at A21 (“The Obama administration has released its rules governing 
‘grandfathered’ insurance plans. Those that qualify will remain legal . . .Those that 
don't will have to comply with costly new mandates.   Throughout his campaign 
for health reform, the president vowed that he wouldn't disrupt Americans' 
existing policies. These rules are . . . .so onerous, though, that most employers will 
find it impossible to follow them.”) (found in Westlaw at 2010 WLNR 19387643).
                                                                                                                                                                            
“generally” have “flexible deadlines or no deadline at all”) (available at 
http://coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=54103bf6-ae3a-47be-
916e-72548ba34b5b).
21 See id. at 3-5 (“no public information found” for many rules that were due to be issued 
by now); Sen. Tom Coburn, HHS Administrative Failure: HHS Failed to Meet a Third of 
Mandated Deadlines Under New Federal Health Care Law, Oct. 4, 2010, available at
http://coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/rightnow?ContentRecord_id=f6efe11e-39bc-
4532-a586-d1ad0b608e80.
22 See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage
Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34538, 34552 (June 17, 2010) (employers 
relinquishing grandfather status estimated at between 33% to 69% for all employers, with 
large employers ranging between 29% and 64%).
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best modeling.”23
“State impacts will vary based on current coverage levels across states, 
generosity of the state’s Medicaid/CHIP eligibility rules and other state-
financed coverage programs, existing private insurance regulatory 
authority, standards, and resources, current state fiscal health, and other 
factors. Such variation creates difficulties in accurately estimating costs 
across states. There are substantial differences among states in terms of the 
percentages of the states’ populations that would meet the definition of 
“newly eligible” under the mandatory Medicaid expansion as compared to 
previously eligible individuals. Federal matching rates to share in the cost 
of Medicaid/CHIP coverage for these individuals under health reform will 
vary by state, by year, and by eligibility status.”
Moreover, the ACA’s Medicaid costs will vary widely among 
States:
24
Moreover, “Beyond the extra Medicaid costs that states are certain to incur, there 
are some other state Medicaid cost increases that are probable, but not definite,” 
such as “payments to so-called Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH) and 
payments to specialist physicians.”25
D. The Law’s Expansive Reach Makes Its Nebulousness More Grave 
 These uncertainties and variations matter enormously because of the 
massive scope of the ACA’s expansion of state Medicaid obligations and the 
ACA’s vast delegation of policymaking to federal officials.26
                                                          
23 Congressional Research Service, Memorandum re: Variation in Analyses of PPACA’s 
Fiscal Impact on States, Sept. 8, 2010, at 1 (Pl. App. Ex. 36).
 “Obamacare’s 
24 Id. at 7.
25 Edmund Haislmaier & Brian Blase, Obamacare: Impact on States, Heritage 
Foundation, July 1, 2010 (Backgrounder #2433), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Obamacare-Impact-on-States.
26 See Botts v. State, 604 S.E.2d 512, 515 (Ga. 2004) (“broad language” of statute made 
its imprecise contours “too vague” to be constitutional, even though those words had a 
“dictionary definition,” especially since their broad reach had the effect of delegating 
“basic policy matters” to government officials on “an ad hoc” basis).
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unfunded mandates are a fiscal time bomb set to explode state balance sheets 
across the country starting in 2014,” creating a fiscal “crisis,” notes the Heritage 
Foundation.27 The ACA will force States to “massively expand their already 
burdensome Medicaid rolls” to include “all non-elderly individuals with family 
incomes below 138 percent of the federal poverty line.”28 “But that is just the 
benefit costs.  Obamacare does not pay for any of the costs necessary to administer 
the expansion of the Medicaid rolls, rolls that are expected to increase by 
approximately 50 percent in states like Nevada, Oregon, and Texas”; indeed, “just 
the administrative costs of the Obamacare Medicaid expansion will cost almost 
$12 billion by 2020.” 29
                                                          
27 Heritage Foundation, Morning Bell: The Obamacare Burden To Your State Budget,
November 12th, 2010 at 9:22am (http://blog.heritage.org/2010/11/12/morning-bell-the-
obamacare-burden-to-your-state-budget/).
   While the ACA’s precise costs are unknown, preliminary 
estimates suggest staggering increases.  In Texas alone, “the Medicaid expansion 
may add more than 2 million people to the program and cost the state up to $27 
billion in a decade,” while Florida faces “an additional $5.2 billion in spending 
between 2013 and 2019 and more than $1 billion a year beginning in 2017,” and 
California faces billions in “annual costs”; “The seven-year cost of the Medicaid 
expansion in Indiana is estimated to be between $2.59 billion and $3.11 billion, 
with 388,000 to 522,000 people joining the state’s Medicaid rolls,” while
28 Id. The 138 percent figure reflects “the 133 percent FPL [federal poverty level] plus
extra 5% FPL that is to be disregarded from individuals’ income when determining 
Medicaid eligibility.” See Congressional Research Service, Summary of Potential 
Employer Penalties Under PPACA (P.L. 111-148), Apr. 5, 2010, at pg. 2 (available at 
http://www.ltgov.ri.gov/smallbusiness/employerprovisions.pdf).
29Heritage Foundation, The Obamacare Burden To Your State Budget, supra note 27,
citing Haislmaier & Blase, supra note 25.
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“Obamacare will result in nearly one of five Nebraskans being covered by 
Medicaid.30 (While increasing the States’ costs, the ACA apparently reduces 
some of their revenues, such as pharmacy rebate revenue.31
  The indefinite nature of the States’ long-run financial commitments to 
Medicaid make the ACA on its face contractually infirm and hence 
unconstitutional.  It also undermines political accountability and aggravates the 
coerciveness and unduly burdensome nature of the Act.
)  
32
Although the Act indicates that the federal government will initially pay for 
some Medicaid expansions, the States are advised that they will pay for 10 percent 
of some unspecified costs in four years, and there is no indication that the States 
will not pay more in succeeding periods.  In the initial, spare introduction of 
Medicaid in 1965, there was no hint that the States 45 years later would be coerced 
to spend a substantial proportion of their budgets on Medicaid under the ACA.
 
33
                                                          
30 Lanhee Chen, How Obamacare Burdens Already Strained State Budgets, Heritage 
Foundation, Nov. 10, 2010 (Backgrounder #2489) (available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/How-Obamacare-Burdens-Already-
Strained-State-Budgets), citing estimates by the Florida Agency for Health Care 
Administration and the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, and a study by the 
Milliman econometrics experts hired by Nebraska and Indiana).
31 See Milliman Explains Assumptions and Methodology Used in Nebraska Medicaid 
Budget Exposure Analysis, Daily Pak Banker, Sept. 19, 2010 (2010 WLNR 18614676). 
32 Virginia v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 571 (4th Cir. 1997) (spending-clause legislation must 
speak “affirmatively and unambiguously, so that its design is known and the States may 
marshal their political will in opposition” to expropriations of sovereign rights); cf. Reno 
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (“vagueness” relevant to “overbreadth inquiry”).
33 On average states spend 16.8 percent of their general-fund budgets on Medicaid, with 
Rhode Island spending 23.5 percent and Minnesota 16.8 percent. See Georgetown Health 
Policy Institute Center for Children and Families, Medicaid and State Budgets: Looking 
at the Facts (2008), available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-
action?file=ccf%20publications/about%20medicaid/nasbo%20final%205-1-08.pdf (last 
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States also face great uncertainty as to the Medicaid cost-share ratio for a large 
new population of single adults without children that the ACA adds to Medicaid.34
E. By Leaving the Federal Government With Unbridled Power to Expand 
States’ Medicaid Obligations, the ACA Violates Principles Forbidding 
Illusory and Indeterminate Contracts
Even if there were some guarantee of a limitation on State obligations 
under the ACA’s expansions of Medicaid, such a promise would be functionally 
meaningless.  As the Defendants admit, any such promise could be changed at the 
Defendants’ whims, without any limitations or any consent by the States. See
Defs. Mem. Dis. at 16 (arguing that Congress has “full and complete power” under 
42 U.S.C. § 1304 to make any alteration or amendments); id. at 15 n.7 (“Here, 
Congress changed a core element of Medicaid”).35 Indeed, backers of the Act 
have called it a mere “starter home” to be expanded and fleshed out through future 
legislation and administrative action,36 which will make Medicare a “model of 
simplicity compared with the current law.”37
                                                                                                                                                                            
visited Nov. 10, 2010). Plaintiff States overall spend similar percentages. Id. Those 
percentages will rise under the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid.
34 It is not clear whether the ratios will be drawn from the ACA itself, or other legislation, 
like the enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentages under the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111-152
35 See Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1994) (“A court can appropriately 
treat statements in briefs as binding judicial admissions of fact”), citing Young & Vann 
Supply Co. v. Gulf F. & A. Ry. Co., 5 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir.1925).
36 Senator Tom Harkin, Health Legislation A Solid Foundation to Build Upon,
Wilmington News-Journal, Dec. 30, 2009 (calling passage of the ACA “the opening act 
in health reform, not the final act. . .I think of the current health reform bill as something 
of a ‘starter home’” that “has plenty of room for additions and improvements”)(available 
in Westlaw news database at 2009 WLNR 26128708); Harkin Statement on the Social 
Security and Medicare Board of Trustees Annual Report to Congress, Aug. 6, 2010 (2010 
WLNR 156788171) (again calling ACA “starter home”); Health Care: Just A Start,
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It cannot be the case that the federal government has unbridled authority to 
make any amendments to Medicaid, no matter how coercive or arbitrary, or how 
fundamentally they change the contractual bargain between the federal 
government and the States.  See 1 Williston on Contracts § 4:21 (4th ed., updated 
May 2010) (“a reservation in either party of a future unbridled right to determine 
the nature of the performance” renders contract “too indefinite for enforcement”).  
In contract law, such unbridled power vested in one party makes the 
contract illusory and non-enforceable.  See Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 2 
cmt. e (“Words of promise which by their terms make performance entirely 
optional with the ‘promisor’ whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct 
in other respects he may pursue, do not constitute a promise.”); § 77 cmt. a
(“Words of promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional with 
the ‘promisor’ do not constitute a promise.”).  For this reason too, as well as for 
obvious reasons of duress and contractual adhesion, the ACA does not qualify as a 
contractually enforceable deal with the States, and violates Pennhurst’s now-well-
                                                                                                                                                                            
Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 5, 2010 (Harkin called ACA “starter home” with “great 
foundation” with “room for expansions and additions”) (2010 WLNR 197651); Jacob 
Hacker, Health Reform 2.0, American Prospect, Sept. 1, 2010, at A25 (“Sen. Tom Harkin 
put the point well when he described the health bill as a “starter home.”  What Harkin 
neglected to mention is that the home isn't built yet”) (2010 WLNR 17483695).
37 Jacob Hacker, Health Reform 2.0, American Prospect, Sept. 1, 2010, at A25 (backer of 
ACA observes that “Medicare was a model of simplicity compared with the current law”;  
ACA “eschewed the simple approach to expanding coverage embodied in Medicare”).
Case 3:10-cv-00091-RV  -EMT   Document 132    Filed 11/19/10   Page 18 of 20
15 
 
accepted contractual conceptualization of Spending Clause conditions.
Dated: November 19, 2010 
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